HOW DO I KNOW WHICH EQUITY-INDEXED ANNUITY IS BEST FOR ME?

As with any other insurance product, you must carefully consider your own personal situation and how you feed about the choices available. No single annuity design may have all the features you want. It is important to understand the features and trade-offs available so you can chose the annuity that is right for you. Keep in mind that it may be misleading to compare one annuity to another unless you compare all the other features of each annuity. You must decide for yourself what combination of features makes the most sense for you. Also remember that it is not possible to predict the future behavior of an index.

Annuities

HOW DO I KNOW IF AN EQUITY-INDEXED ANNUITY IS RIGHT FOR ME?

The questions listed below may help you decide which type of annuity, if any, meets your retirement planning and financial needs. You should consider what your goals are for the money you may put into the annuity. You need to think about how much risk you're willing to take with the money. Ask yourself:

Am I interested in a variable annuity with the potential for higher earnings that are not guaranteed and willing to risk losing the principal?

Is guaranteed interest rate more important to me, with little or no risk of losing the principal?

Or, am I somewhere in between these two extremes and willing to take some risks?

WHAT WILL IT COST ME TO TAKE MY MONEY OUT BEFORE THE END OF THE TERM?

In addition to the information discussed in this Buyer's Guide about surrender and withdrawal charges and free withdrawals, there are additional considerations for equity-indexed annuities. Some annuities credit none of the index-linked interest or only part of it if you take out money before the end of the term. The percentage that is vested, or credited, generally increases as the term comes closer to its end and is always 100% at the end of the term.

ARE DIVIDENDS INCLUDED IN THE INDEX?

Depending on the index used, stock dividends may or may not be included in the index's value. For example, the S&P 500 is a Stock price index and only considers the prices of stocks. It does not recognize any dividends paid on those stocks.

Is Fixed Annuity Interest Compounding?

Interest Compounding

It is important for you to know whether your annuity pays compound or simple interest during a term. While you may earn less from an annuity that pays simple interest, it may have other features you want, such as a higher participation rate.
Annuity

WHAT WILL IT COST ME TO TAKE MY MONEY OUT BEFORE THE END OF THE TERM?

In addition to the information discussed in this Buyer's Guide about surrender and withdrawal charges and free withdrawals, there are additional considerations for equity-indexed annuities. Some annuities credit none of the index-linked interest or only part of it if you take out money before the end of the term. The percentage that is vested, or credited, generally increases as the term comes closer to its end and is always 100% at the end of the term.

SEC to hear more on index annuity regulation

SEC to hear more on index annuity regulation - InvestmentNews

By Darla Mercado
October 13, 2008, 3:47 PM EST


The Securities and Exchange Commission has reopened the comment period for its proposed rule on federal regulation of index annuities.

The Washington-based regulator made the announcement on Friday, giving the public thirty days from the publication of the extension in the Federal Register.

The rule, known as 151 A, would define the terms “annuity contract” and “optional annuity contract” under the Securities Act of 1933, clarifying index annuities’ status under the federal securities laws.

Were the rule to be approved, the products would come under the jurisdiction of the SEC and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority Inc. of New York and Washington.

Comments may be submitted here.

Annuity Definition
Annuity Buyer's Guide
Fixed Annuity info

Index Annuity Sales for AEL

AMEB,AEL American Equity: Year-to-Date Annuity Sales Up 6% From Year Ago

American Equity: Year-to-Date Annuity Sales Up 6% From Year Ago

WEST DES MOINES, Iowa, Oct 07, 2008 (A. M. Best via COMTEX) -- AEL | Quote | Chart | News | PowerRating -- American Equity Investment Life Holding Co., a top seller of equity-indexed annuities in the United States, said year-to-date annuity sales rose 6% from the same period a year ago.

Ahead of releasing its third-quarter earnings next month, American Equity (NYSE: AEL | Quote | Chart | News | PowerRating) on Oct. 3 said annuity sales for the quarter totaled $571.8 million, bringing year-to-date sales to $1.7 billion for the first nine months of this year, up from $1.6 billion in the same period in 2007.

At the end of trading Oct. 6, American Equity Investment Life led the A.M. Best Global Insurance Composite Index -- up 17.93% from the previous close. The A.M. Best Global Index closed at 859.99 -- down 6.72%.

The West Des Moines, Iowa-based company will release third-quarter earnings Nov. 5 after the market closes. For year-end 2007, American Equity's net income declined 61.6% to $29 million, while total revenues dropped to $915.9 million, a decrease of 22%.

Debate surrounds indexed annuities. Back in June, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission proposed a rule, 151A, that would define certain indexed annuities as securities products. Under the rule, these annuities ? currently regulated as insurance products ? would be treated as securities if amounts payable by the insurer are more likely than not to exceed amounts guaranteed under the contract.

Insurance carriers would need to refile the products with the SEC and offer them via a prospectus. Agents who wish to continue selling them would need to become registered representatives overseen by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, a status held by only about 55% of those who currently sell the products (BestWire, Sept. 8, 2008).

The comment period for the SEC's proposal ended Sept. 10. As of that day, 2,400 comments were sent to the SEC and about 90% were in opposition, American Equity said. The SEC has continued to accept comments received after the deadline, it said.

American Equity said it co-hosted a Congressional "fly-in" in Washington, D.C., on Sept. 23 in which the Coalition for Indexed Products, made up nine companies and a group of national marketing organizations representing the coalition, met with nearly 80 members of Congress. They urged members to tell the SEC the measure isn't needed because indexed annuity sales "are already heavily regulated by state insurance departments and would restrict consumer choice at a time when access to principal-protected products like fixed-index annuities should be carefully guarded," American Equity said.

The SEC, which adopted the proposed rule unanimously, has pointed to allegations of abuses in the marketing of indexed annuities to seniors, and has sought supervision by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority of those who sell the products. According to the SEC, among complaints made to state securities regulators, cases involving annuities represented 65% of the caseload in Massachusetts, and 60% of the caseload in Hawaii and Mississippi (BestWire, July 28, 2008).

(By Fran Matso Lysiak, senior associate editor, BestWeek: fran.lysiak@ambest.com)

Annuity Index Annuity Fixed Annuity

Advice for men and women about women's financial security in retirement

Advice for men and women about women's financial security in retirement - The Boston Globe

I've thought about dying before my wife Georgina after reading two recent studies on women and retirement.

"Compared with men, women will likely have lower retirement savings yet they'll need to make those savings last longer and plan on being on their own at some point," concludes "Why Women Worry," part of ongoing research on retirement issues by the financial firm The Hartford and MIT's AgeLab.

On average, a woman, 65, can expect to live to 85, about three years longer than men, and has a 23 percent chance of living past 95, based on mortality tables.

"When a woman outlives her husband, her income decreases by 50 percent on average yet expenses only decrease by 20 percent," the study said.

The second study, "Lifetime Income for Women: A Financial Economist's Perspective," was authored by David Babbel, a professor at the Wharton School of Business, and cosponsored by New York Life Insurance Co.

Babbel argues women should allocate substantially less money to stocks and stock mutual funds in retirement and more to immediate annuities that guarantee an income for life in return for a lump-sum premium.

"Annuities are even more important for women because their risks are compounded by longer life expectancy as well as potentially outliving husbands by six years or more (wives tend to be younger than their husbands)," said Babbel. He concludes that income annuities from top-rated insurance companies can provide secure lifetime income for 25 to 40 percent less money than it would take an individual.

That's because insurance companies base their payouts on average life expectancies (premiums from those who die early subsidize payments to those who live longer). When we invest on our own, we must plan for our money to last several years beyond life expectancy, just in case.

For this reason, financial planners often recommend retirees withdraw no more than 4 percent of savings the first year of retirement, increasing the amount by 3 percent a year to counteract inflation.

But, several top-rated insurance companies offer lifetime annuities with payout rates of 5 percent or more the first year for a 65-year-old couple, raising the amount 3 percent a year and with a "refund" feature (if both spouses die before income payments equal the premium, a beneficiary gets the difference).

But with income annuities, we typically give up our principal and can't access it beyond the scheduled income payments. Some contracts allow exceptions at the cost of lowering income.

In all states, guaranty associations belonging to the National Organization of Life and Health Guaranty Associations back income annuity obligations up to a limit ($100,000 or more per company depending on the state) per policyholder if an insurance company goes bankrupt.

Humberto Cruz is a syndicated columnist. He can be reached at askhumberto@aol.com.

Fixed Annuity

Index Annuity

Annuity Information

WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF SOME OTHER EQUITY-INDEXED ANNUITY PRODUCT FEATURES?

Cap in Interest Earned

While a cap limits the amount of interest you might earn each year, annuities with this feature may have other product features you want, such as annual interest crediting or the ability to take partial withdrawals. Also, annuities that have a cap may have a higher participation rate.

Averaging

Averaging at the beginning of a term protects you from buying your annuity at a high point, which would reduce the amount of interest you might earn. Averaging at the end of the term protects you against severe declines in the index and losing index-linked interest as a result. On the other hand, averaging may reduce the amount of index-linked interest you earn when the index rises either near the start or at the end of the term.

Participation Rate

The participation rate may vary greatly from one annuity to another and from time to time within a particular annuity. Therefore, it is important for you to know how your annuity's participation rate works with the indexing method. A high participation rate may be offset by other features, such a simple interest, averaging, or a point to point indexing method. On the other hand, an insurance company may offset a lower participation rate by also offering a feature such as an annual reset indexing method.

What Is Fixed Index Annuity - Annual Point To Point?

The index linked interest, if any, is based on the difference between the index value at the end of the term and the index value at the start of the term. Interest is added to your annuity at the end of the term.

Since interest cannot be calculated before the end of the term, use of this design may permit a higher participation rate than annuities using other designs.

Since interest is not credited until the end of the term, typically six or seven years, you may not be able to get the index-linked interest until the end of the term.

Annuity

Annuity Rates

HOW DO THE COMMON INDEXING METHODS DIFFER?

Vesting

Some annuities credit none of the index-linked interest or only part of it, if you take out all your money before the end of the term. The percentage that is vested, or credited, generally increases as the term comes closer to its end and is always 100% at the end of the term.

HOW DO THE COMMON INDEXING METHODS DIFFER?

Annual Reset

Index-linked interest, if any, is determined each year by comparing the index value at the end of the contract year with the index value at the start of the contract year. Interest is added to your annuity each year during the term.
Annuity

FDIC May Need $150 Billion Bailout as More Banks Fail

FDIC May Need $150 Billion Bailout as More Banks Fail (Update3)

By David Evans
More Photos/Details

Sept. 25 (Bloomberg) -- Deborah Horn tugs on the handle of the glass-paned entrance of the IndyMac Bancorp Inc. branch in Manhattan Beach, California. The door won't budge. The weekend is approaching, and Horn, 44, the sole breadwinner in a family of three, needs cash.

A small notice taped to the window on this Friday afternoon in mid-July tells her why she's been locked out. IndyMac has failed, the single-spaced, letter-sized paper says; the bank is now in the hands of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.

``The Receiver is now taking possession of the Bank,'' the sign says.

``I'm physically shaking,'' says Horn, an academic tutor, as she peers into the bank. Inside, an FDIC examiner is talking to six stone-faced IndyMac employees. ``I don't know when I'm going to be able to get my money,'' Horn says. ``I'm a single mom. This is the money I live on.''

Don't worry about Horn. She'll be all right, as will most of Pasadena, California-based IndyMac's 200,000-plus customers.

That's because the FDIC, created in 1934, insures all accounts up to $100,000 at its member banks, and it has never failed to honor a claim. The people to worry about are U.S. taxpayers.

The IndyMac debacle is taking a large bite out of FDIC reserves, and if scores of other banks fail in the year ahead, the fund will be depleted. Taxpayers will have to step in.

Worst Wave

Americans had gotten used to the idea that bank failures were as rare as a category five hurricane. No banks went bust in 2005 or 2006. Seven collapsed in 2007 as the credit crisis began to exact a toll. So far in 2008, 12 more, with total assets of $42 billion, have fallen -- that's the worst wave of bank failures since 1992.

IndyMac, which had $32 billion in assets when it went into receivership, is the most expensive bank failure the FDIC has ever covered. And that record may not stand for long.

By the end of 2009, about 100 U.S. banks with collective assets of more than $800 billion will fail, predicts Christopher Whalen, managing director of Institutional Risk Analytics, a Torrance, California-based firm that sells its analysis of FDIC data to investors.

``It's not going to be Armageddon,'' says Mark Vaughan, a financial economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Virginia and a senior lecturer in economics at Washington University in St. Louis. ``But it's going to be bad.''

FDIC's Secret List

The FDIC knows which banks are at risk; it has a watch list with 117 institutions. The agency won't disclose their names because doing so could cause depositors to panic and pull out all of their funds.

It won't take many more failures before the FDIC itself runs out of money. The agency had $45.2 billion in its coffers as of June 30, far short of the $200 billion Whalen says it will need to pay claims by the end of next year. The U.S. Treasury will almost certainly come to the rescue by lending money to the FDIC.

Regardless of who wins control of the White House and Congress in November, no politician is likely to vote in favor of leaving federally insured depositors out in the cold.

A taxpayer bailout of the FDIC would come on the heels of intervention by the U.S. Treasury Department and Federal Reserve to save investment bank Bear Stearns Cos., mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the world's largest insurer, American International Group Inc.

Uninsured Deposits

Emergency federal lending to the FDIC could swell the cost of government rescues of failed financial institutions to more than $400 billion -- not including the $700 billion general Wall Street bailout now under discussion in Congress. Under federal statute, the FDIC must pay back any loans from the Treasury.

That number would be even higher if the government were on the hook for uninsured deposits -- which amount to $2.6 trillion, 37 percent of the total of $7 trillion held in the U.S. branches of all FDIC member banks.

The subprime crisis -- which started in the suburbs of California and Florida and migrated through the alchemy of securitization to Wall Street investment banks -- has come almost full circle, spreading its toxins to the very lenders who first extended those teaser-rate, no-document mortgages to homeowners.

In 2006, IndyMac was the largest provider of mortgages that didn't require borrowers to provide proof of their incomes. And as of mid-September, investors were worried that Washington Mutual Inc., the biggest thrift in the U.S., would be the next bank to go belly up.

A federal takeover of Washington Mutual, which has assets of $310 billion, could cost taxpayers $24 billion more, according to Richard Bove, an analyst at Miami-based Ladenburg Thalmann & Co.

Slower To Hit

The reckoning that has run through Wall Street, claiming investment banks Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and Bear Stearns among its victims, has been slower to hit Main Street. In mid- 2007, Wall Street firms began disclosing losses on their packages of securitized home loans.

From August 2007 to September 2008, banks worldwide wrote down more than $500 billion. Regional banks, by contrast, have waited to write off their bad mortgages, hoping the housing market would improve and defaults would level off. Instead, they've risen.

FDIC-insured banks charged off $26.4 billion of bad loans in the second quarter of 2008, the most since 1991.

U.S. lenders, in their embrace of subprime lending, committed the same analytical fallacy as their Wall Street counterparts. When it came to assessing risk, they relied on the recent past to predict the near future.

Living in the Past

They were blinded by years of rising home prices and low mortgage default rates.

The FDIC fell into the same trap. As recently as March, an internal FDIC memo estimated the cost to cover bank collapses in 2008 would be just $1 billion, dropping to $450 million in 2009. It wasn't even close.

The IndyMac failure alone, which happened four months after that memo was circulated, will cost the FDIC $8.9 billion -- and the bill for all 12 collapses will be about $11 billion, the FDIC says.

FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair says the agency's forecast was based on models using data from the past 20 years, which included long periods with few bank failures.

``Given the change in economic conditions, we need to weight the more recent data more heavily,'' Bair says. ``You also need a good dose of common sense.''

Bair says depositors shouldn't fret about their banks. ``We do have a handful with some significant challenges,'' she says. ``Overall, banks are quite safe and sound.''

Bair is duty bound to say that, says Joseph Mason, an economist who worked for the Treasury from 1995 to 1998. Part of the FDIC's job is to reassure the public and prevent runs on banks. Mason says Bair's rhetoric masks the agency's inability to grasp the scope of the coming crisis.

`Ignoring the Problem'

``The FDIC and the banking regulators are ignoring the problems, hoping they'll go away,'' he says. ``They won't.''

The quake that shook markets in September may make the FDIC's task more complicated and expensive. With investment banks in eclipse, deposit-taking institutions will now play a larger role in financing the economy.

Earlier this month, Bank of America Corp. agreed to buy Merrill Lynch & Co. for $50 billion, and Wachovia Corp. and Morgan Stanley were in talks about a potential merger.

'Would Be Miraculous'

From 2002 to 2007, U.S. lenders made a total of $2.5 trillion in subprime mortgages, according to the newsletter Inside Mortgage Finance. ``Given the magnitude of the bad loans still on bank balance sheets, it would be miraculous for the FDIC to squeak by with losses of less than $200 billion,'' Whalen says.

On Sept. 18, in yet another stunning turn of events, Paulson proposed a plan that would cost the government, if not necessarily the FDIC, hundreds of billions of dollars more.

The Treasury secretary says the government will purchase toxic mortgage debt from banks in an effort to cleanse the financial system. In an unprecedented move, the Treasury also pledged $50 billion to insure nonbank money market funds.

Bair says Paulson's plan won't reduce the number of banks on the FDIC's watch list.

One reason the rolling financial crisis is hitting regional banks later than it walloped Wall Street is because the very system that is meant to protect depositors -- federal insurance -- has also served to prop up weak lenders. So has the ready supply of credit extended to banks by another government-chartered group, the Federal Home Loan Banks.

Because all deposits up to $100,000 are insured, most savers can be agnostic about where they put their money. They don't have to know -- or care -- whether a bank is making sound or foolish loans.

Unlike buyers of stocks or bonds, people who put their money in banks rarely do research about the soundness of the institution. That makes it easy for banks -- both prudent and reckless ones -- to raise cash.

Brokered Deposits Loophole

Banks have taken the FDIC's protection and run with it, thanks to the phenomenon of brokered deposits -- and a giant loophole in federal regulations.

As of June 30, Whalen says banks held $644 billion from brokers who offer customers a way to gain FDIC insurance for multiple accounts.

Promontory Interfinancial Network LLC, an Arlington, Virginia-based company founded in 2002 by former federal officials --including some from the FDIC itself -- has figured out how to help wealthy clients insure as much as $50 million each by putting their money into separate accounts at 500 different banks.

While the law does limit insurance to $100,000 per account, it places no ceiling on the number of different banks where an individual can hold accounts -- a loophole Congress failed to close even after the savings and loan debacle of 1984-1992.

Missing Discipline

Bair says brokered deposits can provide quick cash but also create potential danger.

``It is quite easy to get brokered deposits, and there's not a lot of market discipline with the brokered deposits,'' she says. ``When there's excessive reliance on them, particularly to fuel rapid growth on the balance sheet, that's definitely a high-risk factor.''

The other big source of money for banks is the FHLB, an under-the-radar network of 12 regional banks created by Congress in 1932 to help lenders finance mortgages. Lenders had borrowed a total of $840.6 billion from the FHLB system as of June 30, up 38 percent from $608 billion in the same period a year earlier.

Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, in a little-noticed action on Sept. 7, the day after he announced the bailout of Fannie and Freddie, extended a secured credit line to the FHLB to provide an emergency source of funding if needed.

FHLB Advances

Vaughan says credit from the FHLB is keeping some sick banks afloat and postponing the inevitable.

`What's going to happen,'' he says, ``is that weak banks will use FHLB advances to avoid discipline from funding markets. In some cases, that will keep their doors open longer than they otherwise would, all-the-while offloading more and more potential losses onto the FDIC and taxpayers.''

Normally, the FDIC is no more than four initials customers see when they walk into their banks. In recent years, the agency hasn't had to close many banks, as it collected small amounts of insurance premium payments.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the law creating the FDIC in the middle of the Depression. As part of the New Deal, Congress created a system of federal insurance to end bank runs by reassuring the public that depositing money in banks was safe. All banks paid the same rate for insurance.

Wave of Failures

The FDIC shares regulatory authority with other agencies. The Office of Thrift Supervision oversees federally chartered savings and loans, the Comptroller of the Currency monitors national banks, and state banking regulators review state- chartered banks.

The FDIC is the only one of these agencies that insures deposits.

By and large, the government's insurance system worked until the 1980s, when thrifts went on a commercial real estate lending binge, triggering a wave of failures and consolidation that lasted from 1984 to 1992.

In 1991, Congress changed the way FDIC premiums were assessed, requiring banks to pay rates based on how well capitalized they were for the risks they faced. As bank failures subsided to less than a dozen a year by 1995, the FDIC's reserves began to swell.

As a result, the agency cut to zero the premiums it charged to the 90 percent of the banks deemed safest. That free ride continued for 10 years.

`No Good Way'

In 2006, Congress increased insurance payments for most banks, averaging $5-$7 per $10,000 of deposits.

The insurance premiums imposed by the FDIC on the riskiest banks -- running as high as $43 per $10,000 -- are still far below the rates private insurers would charge, says Sherrill Shaffer, former chief economist of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

At the same time, charging struggling banks a fair price for insurance premiums may drive them into insolvency, he says.

``That can be destabilizing,'' says Shaffer, who's now a professor of banking at the University of Wyoming in Laramie. ``There's really no good way around that. It's an issue that policy makers and analysts have wrestled with for decades.''

Bair says the FDIC is gearing up for the coming wave of bank failures. She says she's developing a plan to raise insurance premiums.

The agency's Division of Resolutions and Receiverships has boosted authorized staffing levels by 48 percent, to 331, this year. It has hired 178 new financial specialists and called up 65 retirees for temporary service under a special program.

Bair vs. Enron

Bair, 54, an attorney who graduated from the University of Kansas School of Law, has challenged financial institutions as a regulator for more than a decade. President George W. Bush nominated her as chairman, and she was sworn in on June 26, 2006.

She replaced Donald Powell, a former Texas banker. In 1992, as a member of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Bair cast the lone vote against Enron Corp.'s effort to exempt certain energy contracts from the agency's anti-fraud and anti- market manipulation enforcement powers.

Nine years later, Enron blew up in one of the biggest financial scandals in U.S. history.

As assistant secretary of the Treasury for financial institutions in 2002, Bair criticized abusive subprime mortgage brokers.

``Lenders have made loans with little or no regard for a borrower's ability to repay and have engaged in multiple refinance transactions that result in little or no benefit to a borrower,'' she told the Pittsburgh Community Reinvestment Group on March 18, 2002.

`Rock and Brock'

Bair has published two children's books. One of them, ``Rock, Brock, and the Savings Shock'' (Albert Whitman, 2006) is a tale of two twins -- Rock the Saver and Brock the Spender

To contact the reporter on this story: David Evans in Los Angeles at davidevans@bloomberg.net
Last Updated: September 25, 2008 19:54 EDT

Fixed Annuity Definition

FDIC May Need $150 Billion Bailout as More Banks Fail

FDIC May Need $150 Billion Bailout as More Banks Fail (Update3)

By David Evans
More Photos/Details

Sept. 25 (Bloomberg) -- Deborah Horn tugs on the handle of the glass-paned entrance of the IndyMac Bancorp Inc. branch in Manhattan Beach, California. The door won't budge. The weekend is approaching, and Horn, 44, the sole breadwinner in a family of three, needs cash.

A small notice taped to the window on this Friday afternoon in mid-July tells her why she's been locked out. IndyMac has failed, the single-spaced, letter-sized paper says; the bank is now in the hands of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.

``The Receiver is now taking possession of the Bank,'' the sign says.

``I'm physically shaking,'' says Horn, an academic tutor, as she peers into the bank. Inside, an FDIC examiner is talking to six stone-faced IndyMac employees. ``I don't know when I'm going to be able to get my money,'' Horn says. ``I'm a single mom. This is the money I live on.''

Don't worry about Horn. She'll be all right, as will most of Pasadena, California-based IndyMac's 200,000-plus customers.

That's because the FDIC, created in 1934, insures all accounts up to $100,000 at its member banks, and it has never failed to honor a claim. The people to worry about are U.S. taxpayers.

The IndyMac debacle is taking a large bite out of FDIC reserves, and if scores of other banks fail in the year ahead, the fund will be depleted. Taxpayers will have to step in.

Worst Wave

Americans had gotten used to the idea that bank failures were as rare as a category five hurricane. No banks went bust in 2005 or 2006. Seven collapsed in 2007 as the credit crisis began to exact a toll. So far in 2008, 12 more, with total assets of $42 billion, have fallen -- that's the worst wave of bank failures since 1992.

IndyMac, which had $32 billion in assets when it went into receivership, is the most expensive bank failure the FDIC has ever covered. And that record may not stand for long.

By the end of 2009, about 100 U.S. banks with collective assets of more than $800 billion will fail, predicts Christopher Whalen, managing director of Institutional Risk Analytics, a Torrance, California-based firm that sells its analysis of FDIC data to investors.

``It's not going to be Armageddon,'' says Mark Vaughan, a financial economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Virginia and a senior lecturer in economics at Washington University in St. Louis. ``But it's going to be bad.''

FDIC's Secret List

The FDIC knows which banks are at risk; it has a watch list with 117 institutions. The agency won't disclose their names because doing so could cause depositors to panic and pull out all of their funds.

It won't take many more failures before the FDIC itself runs out of money. The agency had $45.2 billion in its coffers as of June 30, far short of the $200 billion Whalen says it will need to pay claims by the end of next year. The U.S. Treasury will almost certainly come to the rescue by lending money to the FDIC.

Regardless of who wins control of the White House and Congress in November, no politician is likely to vote in favor of leaving federally insured depositors out in the cold.

A taxpayer bailout of the FDIC would come on the heels of intervention by the U.S. Treasury Department and Federal Reserve to save investment bank Bear Stearns Cos., mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the world's largest insurer, American International Group Inc.

Uninsured Deposits

Emergency federal lending to the FDIC could swell the cost of government rescues of failed financial institutions to more than $400 billion -- not including the $700 billion general Wall Street bailout now under discussion in Congress. Under federal statute, the FDIC must pay back any loans from the Treasury.

That number would be even higher if the government were on the hook for uninsured deposits -- which amount to $2.6 trillion, 37 percent of the total of $7 trillion held in the U.S. branches of all FDIC member banks.

The subprime crisis -- which started in the suburbs of California and Florida and migrated through the alchemy of securitization to Wall Street investment banks -- has come almost full circle, spreading its toxins to the very lenders who first extended those teaser-rate, no-document mortgages to homeowners.

In 2006, IndyMac was the largest provider of mortgages that didn't require borrowers to provide proof of their incomes. And as of mid-September, investors were worried that Washington Mutual Inc., the biggest thrift in the U.S., would be the next bank to go belly up.

A federal takeover of Washington Mutual, which has assets of $310 billion, could cost taxpayers $24 billion more, according to Richard Bove, an analyst at Miami-based Ladenburg Thalmann & Co.

Slower To Hit

The reckoning that has run through Wall Street, claiming investment banks Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and Bear Stearns among its victims, has been slower to hit Main Street. In mid- 2007, Wall Street firms began disclosing losses on their packages of securitized home loans.

From August 2007 to September 2008, banks worldwide wrote down more than $500 billion. Regional banks, by contrast, have waited to write off their bad mortgages, hoping the housing market would improve and defaults would level off. Instead, they've risen.

FDIC-insured banks charged off $26.4 billion of bad loans in the second quarter of 2008, the most since 1991.

U.S. lenders, in their embrace of subprime lending, committed the same analytical fallacy as their Wall Street counterparts. When it came to assessing risk, they relied on the recent past to predict the near future.

Living in the Past

They were blinded by years of rising home prices and low mortgage default rates.

The FDIC fell into the same trap. As recently as March, an internal FDIC memo estimated the cost to cover bank collapses in 2008 would be just $1 billion, dropping to $450 million in 2009. It wasn't even close.

The IndyMac failure alone, which happened four months after that memo was circulated, will cost the FDIC $8.9 billion -- and the bill for all 12 collapses will be about $11 billion, the FDIC says.

FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair says the agency's forecast was based on models using data from the past 20 years, which included long periods with few bank failures.

``Given the change in economic conditions, we need to weight the more recent data more heavily,'' Bair says. ``You also need a good dose of common sense.''

Bair says depositors shouldn't fret about their banks. ``We do have a handful with some significant challenges,'' she says. ``Overall, banks are quite safe and sound.''

Bair is duty bound to say that, says Joseph Mason, an economist who worked for the Treasury from 1995 to 1998. Part of the FDIC's job is to reassure the public and prevent runs on banks. Mason says Bair's rhetoric masks the agency's inability to grasp the scope of the coming crisis.

`Ignoring the Problem'

``The FDIC and the banking regulators are ignoring the problems, hoping they'll go away,'' he says. ``They won't.''

The quake that shook markets in September may make the FDIC's task more complicated and expensive. With investment banks in eclipse, deposit-taking institutions will now play a larger role in financing the economy.

Earlier this month, Bank of America Corp. agreed to buy Merrill Lynch & Co. for $50 billion, and Wachovia Corp. and Morgan Stanley were in talks about a potential merger.

'Would Be Miraculous'

From 2002 to 2007, U.S. lenders made a total of $2.5 trillion in subprime mortgages, according to the newsletter Inside Mortgage Finance. ``Given the magnitude of the bad loans still on bank balance sheets, it would be miraculous for the FDIC to squeak by with losses of less than $200 billion,'' Whalen says.

On Sept. 18, in yet another stunning turn of events, Paulson proposed a plan that would cost the government, if not necessarily the FDIC, hundreds of billions of dollars more.

The Treasury secretary says the government will purchase toxic mortgage debt from banks in an effort to cleanse the financial system. In an unprecedented move, the Treasury also pledged $50 billion to insure nonbank money market funds.

Bair says Paulson's plan won't reduce the number of banks on the FDIC's watch list.

One reason the rolling financial crisis is hitting regional banks later than it walloped Wall Street is because the very system that is meant to protect depositors -- federal insurance -- has also served to prop up weak lenders. So has the ready supply of credit extended to banks by another government-chartered group, the Federal Home Loan Banks.

Because all deposits up to $100,000 are insured, most savers can be agnostic about where they put their money. They don't have to know -- or care -- whether a bank is making sound or foolish loans.

Unlike buyers of stocks or bonds, people who put their money in banks rarely do research about the soundness of the institution. That makes it easy for banks -- both prudent and reckless ones -- to raise cash.

Brokered Deposits Loophole

Banks have taken the FDIC's protection and run with it, thanks to the phenomenon of brokered deposits -- and a giant loophole in federal regulations.

As of June 30, Whalen says banks held $644 billion from brokers who offer customers a way to gain FDIC insurance for multiple accounts.

Promontory Interfinancial Network LLC, an Arlington, Virginia-based company founded in 2002 by former federal officials --including some from the FDIC itself -- has figured out how to help wealthy clients insure as much as $50 million each by putting their money into separate accounts at 500 different banks.

While the law does limit insurance to $100,000 per account, it places no ceiling on the number of different banks where an individual can hold accounts -- a loophole Congress failed to close even after the savings and loan debacle of 1984-1992.

Missing Discipline

Bair says brokered deposits can provide quick cash but also create potential danger.

``It is quite easy to get brokered deposits, and there's not a lot of market discipline with the brokered deposits,'' she says. ``When there's excessive reliance on them, particularly to fuel rapid growth on the balance sheet, that's definitely a high-risk factor.''

The other big source of money for banks is the FHLB, an under-the-radar network of 12 regional banks created by Congress in 1932 to help lenders finance mortgages. Lenders had borrowed a total of $840.6 billion from the FHLB system as of June 30, up 38 percent from $608 billion in the same period a year earlier.

Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, in a little-noticed action on Sept. 7, the day after he announced the bailout of Fannie and Freddie, extended a secured credit line to the FHLB to provide an emergency source of funding if needed.

FHLB Advances

Vaughan says credit from the FHLB is keeping some sick banks afloat and postponing the inevitable.

`What's going to happen,'' he says, ``is that weak banks will use FHLB advances to avoid discipline from funding markets. In some cases, that will keep their doors open longer than they otherwise would, all-the-while offloading more and more potential losses onto the FDIC and taxpayers.''

Normally, the FDIC is no more than four initials customers see when they walk into their banks. In recent years, the agency hasn't had to close many banks, as it collected small amounts of insurance premium payments.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the law creating the FDIC in the middle of the Depression. As part of the New Deal, Congress created a system of federal insurance to end bank runs by reassuring the public that depositing money in banks was safe. All banks paid the same rate for insurance.

Wave of Failures

The FDIC shares regulatory authority with other agencies. The Office of Thrift Supervision oversees federally chartered savings and loans, the Comptroller of the Currency monitors national banks, and state banking regulators review state- chartered banks.

The FDIC is the only one of these agencies that insures deposits.

By and large, the government's insurance system worked until the 1980s, when thrifts went on a commercial real estate lending binge, triggering a wave of failures and consolidation that lasted from 1984 to 1992.

In 1991, Congress changed the way FDIC premiums were assessed, requiring banks to pay rates based on how well capitalized they were for the risks they faced. As bank failures subsided to less than a dozen a year by 1995, the FDIC's reserves began to swell.

As a result, the agency cut to zero the premiums it charged to the 90 percent of the banks deemed safest. That free ride continued for 10 years.

`No Good Way'

In 2006, Congress increased insurance payments for most banks, averaging $5-$7 per $10,000 of deposits.

The insurance premiums imposed by the FDIC on the riskiest banks -- running as high as $43 per $10,000 -- are still far below the rates private insurers would charge, says Sherrill Shaffer, former chief economist of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

At the same time, charging struggling banks a fair price for insurance premiums may drive them into insolvency, he says.

``That can be destabilizing,'' says Shaffer, who's now a professor of banking at the University of Wyoming in Laramie. ``There's really no good way around that. It's an issue that policy makers and analysts have wrestled with for decades.''

Bair says the FDIC is gearing up for the coming wave of bank failures. She says she's developing a plan to raise insurance premiums.

The agency's Division of Resolutions and Receiverships has boosted authorized staffing levels by 48 percent, to 331, this year. It has hired 178 new financial specialists and called up 65 retirees for temporary service under a special program.

Bair vs. Enron

Bair, 54, an attorney who graduated from the University of Kansas School of Law, has challenged financial institutions as a regulator for more than a decade. President George W. Bush nominated her as chairman, and she was sworn in on June 26, 2006.

She replaced Donald Powell, a former Texas banker. In 1992, as a member of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Bair cast the lone vote against Enron Corp.'s effort to exempt certain energy contracts from the agency's anti-fraud and anti- market manipulation enforcement powers.

Nine years later, Enron blew up in one of the biggest financial scandals in U.S. history.

As assistant secretary of the Treasury for financial institutions in 2002, Bair criticized abusive subprime mortgage brokers.

``Lenders have made loans with little or no regard for a borrower's ability to repay and have engaged in multiple refinance transactions that result in little or no benefit to a borrower,'' she told the Pittsburgh Community Reinvestment Group on March 18, 2002.

`Rock and Brock'

Bair has published two children's books. One of them, ``Rock, Brock, and the Savings Shock'' (Albert Whitman, 2006) is a tale of two twins -- Rock the Saver and Brock the Spender

To contact the reporter on this story: David Evans in Los Angeles at davidevans@bloomberg.net
Last Updated: September 25, 2008 19:54 EDT

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